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A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is
used to study the eect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The no-
tions of \independent strategies" as well as of \common priors" are amended to
render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication.
Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambi-
guity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This
equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players.
A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity
aversion yields substantially dierent predictions - even for the case with just two
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11 Introduction
The Ellsberg paradox shows that people treat risky situations in which they know the odds
of all relevant outcomes dierently from ambiguous situations in which they can only guess
these odds. It has inspired a large range of dierent generalizations of expected utility
theory that can accommodate for the apparent aversion to ambiguity. This branch of
decision theory continues to thrive.1 If anything we might expect that ambiguity aversion
is more relevant for strategic decision making than it is for single person decision making
as people are quite generally harder to predict than natural processes.
It is surprising, then, that the literature on games among players that are ambiguity
averse stayed comparatively small. A review of some applications can be found in Mukerji
and Tallon [26]. It is important to mention that in many of the applications of such
games the players are assumed to be uncertain about the environment rather than about
each other's strategies, see Bade [3], Levin and Ozdenoren [22], Bose, Ozdenoren and
Pape [7]. In contrast the present paper concerns the case in which players are assumed
to be uncertain about each others's strategies.
To do so, the present paper takes up the interpretation of mixed strategy equilibrium
according to which it it assumed that players explicitly randomize over actions and re-
places the assumption that players are expected utility maximizers with the assumption
that players are averse to ambiguity. It is shown that for the class of two player games
the equilibrium predictions are not aected by such a change in the assumption on the
players attitudes towards subjective uncertainty.
To accommodate dierent attitudes towards ambiguity I introduce the assumption that
players can choose to play \ambiguous strategies". The players in the present approach
can not only base their strategies on objective randomization devices such as dices or
roulette wheels, they can also use subjective randomization devices. Players can, for
instance, base the choice of their strategy on the draws from an Ellsberg urn, on a horse
race or even on their feelings. This generalization of the players strategy spaces makes it
possible to endow players with dierent attitudes towards ambiguity.
1For a review on the experimental evidence see Camerer and Weber [9]. Some of the seminal con-
tributions to the decision theory of ambiguity aversion are Schmeidler [28], Gilboa and Schmeidler [16],
and Bewley [5], for a very recent treatment that generalizes many of the available representations see
Cerreira, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montruccio [11].
2The generalization suggested so far actually overshoots the mark of parsimonious devi-
ation that allows us to identify the eect of the players ambiguity attitude on equilibrium
predictions: The introduction of all kinds of subjective randomization devices does not
only allow for dierent attitudes towards ambiguity but also for correlation devices and
wildly diverging beliefs. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are devoted to tacking these two issues. This
is somewhat harder than one might initially think as I cannot rely on probabilistic beliefs
on the state space to dene the notions of \independent strategies" and \common priors".
Once these hurdles are taken I use the standard Nash equilibrium concept to dene an
Ambiguous Act Equilibrium in section 4 as a prole of ambiguous act strategies such that
no player has an incentive to deviate given all other players' strategies.
The denition of an Ambiguous Act Equilibrium can be seen as an answer to the
rst of three questions that Mukerji and Tallon [26] identied as the guiding questions in
research on game theory with ambiguity averse players. In their review of applications
of David Schmeidler's concept of uncertainty aversion they describe these three questions
as follows: \(1)... how should solution concepts ... be dened? (2) questions about the
general behavioral implications of the new solution concepts (3) questions about insights
such innovations might bring to applied contexts". My main contribution to the 2nd
question is a negative one: In the main result of the present paper Theorem 1 I show that
the ambiguous act equilibria and the mixed strategy equilibria of a two player game are
observationally equivalent. In sections 6 until 10 I ask and answer the following questions:
are there any action proles that can arise in mixed strategy equilibrium but would never
arise in ambiguous act equilibrium? Conversely, are there any action proles that are
consistent with the assumption of equilibrium play by ambiguity averse players but are
inconsistent with mixed strategy equilibrium? Can the observation of an action prole tell
us whether the players are ambiguity neutral or averse? For games between two players
with transitive and monotone preferences the answer is negative. In such games the set of
all ambiguous act equilibria is observationally equivalent to the set of all mixed strategy
equilibria, in the sense that any action prole that is consistent with equilibrium play
among uncertainty averse players is consistent with equilibrium play among uncertainty
neutral players. In the present context the answer to Mukerji and Tallon's questions
numbers (2) and (3) is that the general behavioral implications of uncertainty aversion
are not dierent from the general behavioral implications of expected utility maximization
3and consequently that there is little hope for new insights in applied contexts.
I go on to show in sections 11.2 and 11.3 that the prospects for dierent behavioral
implications of dierent ambiguity attitudes do no look as bleak once we leave the setup
of this paper. I show in particular that observational dierence between the equilibrium
play of ambiguity averse players can either arise when there are more than two players or
when the equilibrium concept proposed here is replaced by an equilibrium concept that
extends the notion of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity averse players.
I also show that some of the existing results of behavioral dierence in the literature
on games with ambiguity averse players mainly derive from the assumption that allows
for players' beliefs to diverge \extremely". I juxtapose my denition of ambiguous act
equilibrium with existing equilibrium concepts in section 5, I compare my results to some
of the equilibrium predictions in the literature on games with ambiguity averse players in
section 11.4.
2 General Ambiguous Games
Two player normal form games (in mixed strategies) are denoted by G = (A;%) with
A: = (A1;A2), the players' sets of pure strategies, which are assumed to be nite. The
players preferences are summarized by %: = (%1;%2). They are dened on the set (A),
where (N) denotes the set of all lotteries on any (nite) N. A general ambiguous
act extension of G is a game G0 = (
;A;%0) with the following interpretations of 

and %0: the state space 
 can be represented as the product 
1  
2 of two nite \state
spaces" 
1 and 
2. The preferences %0= (%0
1;%0
2) are dened over all acts f : 
 ! (A);
the restriction of these preferences to the set of all constant acts equals the preferences
in the original game G, formally %0
i j(A) =%i for i = 1;2. The set of player i's strategies
in the ambiguous act extension G0 is the set of all acts fi: 
i ! (Ai). A strategy
prole (f1;f2) induces an act f : 
 ! (A) with f(!)(a) = f1(!1)(a1)f2(!2)(a2) for all
a 2 A. So the probability that an action-prole a = (a1;a2) is being played in state !
is determined as the product of the probabilities that the two players play action ai in
state !. I denote the act induced by a strategy prole (f1;f2) as well as the strategy
prole itself by f. A game G0 is called a general ambiguous game, if it is a general
ambiguous act extension of some game G.
4The assumption that player i's action space consists of all acts fi: 
i ! (Ai) implies
an assumption on player i's knowledge: Player i can only base his actions on the i'th
component of the state since he only knows this aspect of the state. Player i's knowledge
can be described by the event algebra Si on 
 such that Ei 2 Si if ! 2 Ei implies that
(!i;!0
 i) 2 Ei for all !0
 i 2 
 i.2 This assumption is without loss of generality as I could
have dened player i's strategy space equivalently as the set of all Si-measurable acts
f : 
 ! (Ai). It is convenient to dene the events !
i : = f!j!i = !
ig.
The assumption on strategy spaces also implies that players have access to objective
randomizing devices, that can generate any lottery on the action spaces Ai. A player
that can choose any fi: 
i ! (Ai) is free to generate his strategic choices using roulette
wheels, dices, objective computer generators or similar things. In the games under study
players are equally free to base their choices on their mood of the day, or on any other
subjective random device to which they have access. The denition of a game does not
depend on this notion of an act.
Let me note as an aside that games could also be dened for an environment with
Savage acts f : 
 ! A, in which no objective lotteries are assumed. This could be
interesting as the empirical evidence on mixed strategies suggests that \normal" people
are not able to play mixed strategies. Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose [10], Palacios-
Huerrta [27], and Walker and Wooders [29] therefore use \abnormal" people, namely
athletes, to test the predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium. Games played by \normal"
people could be studied in a framework in which strategies are acts f : 
i ! Ai.
2.1 Notation
I use the letters f;g;fi;gi to denote acts. Lotteries on action proles and action spaces
are denoted by p;q 2 (A) or pi;qi 2 (Ai) respectively. As a shorthand I denote a
constant act f with f(!) = p for all ! 2 
 and some p 2 P(A) directly by p (and
accordingly for fi). Degenerate lotteries, that is lotteries p 2 (A) and pi 2 (Ai)
such that p(a) = 1 for some a or pi(ai) = 1 for some ai are denoted a or ai. Finally
constant acts with f(!) = a or fi(!i) = ai for all ! 2 
 or !i 2 
i are denoted by a
and ai respectively. Constant acts a correspond to pure strategy proles, constant acts
ai correspond to pure strategies. Constant acts p and pi correspond to mixed strategy
2I follow the usual convention and dene x i = x2 if i = 1 and x i = x1 otherwise.
5proles and mixed strategies respectively. In short, pure and mixed strategies are naturally
embedded in the framework of general ambiguous games.
The mixture f + (1   )g of two acts f;g is dened component wise, meaning that
(f + (1   )g)(!)(a) = f(!)(a) + (1   )g(!)(a) for all a 2 A and all ! 2 
. The
complement of an event E  
 is denoted by E. For any three acts f;g;h and any
mutually exclusive events E;F  
 I dene the act (f : E;g : F;h : E [ F) by




f(!) for ! 2 E;
g(!) for ! 2 F;
h(!) otherwise
An event E is i-null if (f : E;g : E) i (f : E;h : E) holds for all acts f;g;h: 
 !
(A). If an event is not i-null, then it is called i-non-null.
3 Parsimony
The goal of the present study is to see how the equilibrium predictions for a game change
when the assumption of players maximizing expected utility is replaced by the assumption
of ambiguity averse players. To reach this goal the games studied here should dier from
standard games in mixed strategies in only this one respect. Said dierently, the games
studied here should reduce to standard games in mixed strategies when all players pref-
erences have expected utility representations U = (u;) consisting of utility functionals
u: (A) ! R and priors  2 (
) such that f % g holds for two acts f;g: 
 ! (A),
if and only if U(f) =
P
!2
 (!)u(f(!))  U(g) =
P
!2
 (!)u(g(!)). The general am-
biguous act extensions dened above are too general for the purpose of this study. They
not only allow for various ambiguity attitudes, they also allow for correlation devices and
wildly diverging beliefs.
In fact the notion of a general ambiguous game corresponds to the denition of a
game that Aumann [1] uses in his introduction of the concept of correlated equilibrium.
Aumann starts out with the same general denition of a game and goes on to impose
an expected utility representation. The present project can be seen as complementary to
Aumann's: How would the set of equilibria change, if we dropped the assumption that
players are expected utility maximizers but retained the assumption that players cannot
6rely on any correlation devices? With the goal of the most parsimonious deviation from
standard theory that allows for the introduction of a new aspect I should proceed by
imposing that the strategies of all players are independent and that all players share some
common belief on the underlying state space. In the following two subsections I develop
notions of strategic independence and common beliefs that can be applied to games that
do not allow for an expected utility representation of preferences. This allows me to dene
the notion of ambiguous act extensions, as general ambiguous act extensions that satisfy
the requirements of strategic independence and common beliefs.
3.1 Independent Strategies
Strategies are considered independent, if the randomization devices (namely state spaces

1 and 
2) on which players can condition their strategies are stochastically independent.
The denition of stochastic independence advocated here builds on the idea that the value
of a mixed strategy pi should not depend on the event Ei  
i in which it is played. It
is helpful to consider the standard case in which preferences have an expected utility
representation as dened above to develop and understand this denition. Consider an
act f = (f1;f2) and assume that (!1) > 0 for all !1 2 
1. Observe that U(f) can















2 are stochastically independent according to the standard deni-
tion if and only if
(!1\!2)
(!1) = (!2) for all ! 2 
. This in turn implies that the conditional
value of a mixed strategy p1 does not depend on the event in which it is played, in other
words, the value of U((p1  f2)j!1) =
P
!22
2 u(p1  f2(!2))
(!1\!2)
(!1) does not depend on
!1 as
(!1\!2)
(!1) is equal to (!2) no matter which !1 we choose.
So in a sense, with independent state spaces 
1 and 
2, strategies become \exchange-
able": The mixture p1 yields the same conditional value whether it is played in the event
!1 or in the event !0
1. This, however, does not mean that for independent strategies
players are indierent between any acts ((p1 : E;q1 : E);f2) and ((q1 : E;p1 : E);f2). If
the two events E;E do not have the same size, the acts might yield a dierent expected
utility. The denition of stochastic independence proposed here builds on the idea of
event exchangeability corrected for the dierent size or importance of dierent events.




called k-independent if for all strategy proles f : 
 ! (A), all mutually exclusive
k-non-null events E;F  
i and all mixtures pi;qi 2 (Ai) there exists an  2 [0;1] such
that either
((pi : E;qi : F;fi : E [ F);f i) 0
k ((pi + (1   )qi : E;pi : F;fi : E [ F);f i)
or
((pi : E;qi : F;fi : E [ F);f i) 0
k ((qi : E;pi + (1   )qi : F;fi : E [ F);f i):
The parameter  acts as a corrective for the possibly dierent \size" of E and F.
If players have a prior on 
, these \sizes" can straightforwardly be identied with their
probability as can been seen in the proof of the following lemma. When agents do not base
their decisions on a (single) prior this identication fails and the value of the corrective
parameter  is therefore allowed to adjust endogenously.
Lemma 1 If a player's preferences have an expected utility representation then the be-
havioral notion of independence given in Denition 1 coincides with the standard notion
of independence.
Proof Assume that 
1 and 
2 are independent according to the standard denition.
Then we have for any act ((pi : E;qi : F;fi : E [ F);f i) with (E)  (F)
U
 



































u((qi + (1   )pi)  f2(!2))(!2) + R =
= U
 





2;!1= 2E[F u(f1(!1)  f2(!2))
(!1\!2)
(!1) and  :=
(F)
(E).
Conversely assume that 
1 and 
2 are not independent according to the standard
denition. Then there exist non-null events E  
1 and F  
2 such that (E \ F) >
(E)(F), (E \ F) > (E)(F), (E \ F) < (E)(F) and (E \ F) < (E)(F).
8Dene a game in which player 1 can choose among the strategies T and B, and player 2
can choose from L and R such that the payos to player one are as follows: u(T L) = 1,
u(B  R) =
(F)




(T : E;B : E)  f2









while on the other hand
U1
 
(B : E;T + (1   )B : E)  f2

=
= (E \ F)
(F)
(F)


















+ (1   )(F) = (F)
U1
 
(T + (1   )B : E;T : E)  f2

=
= (E \ F) + (1   )(E \ F)
(F)
(F)
+ (E \ F) =
= 
 
(E \ F) + (E \ F)






+ (E \ F)










for all  2 [0;1]. So there does not exist an  to satisfy the demanded indierence. 
The intuition behind the latter part of the proof translates to preferences that are not
representable by expected utility functions. Suppose player 2 conditions his strategy on
some event F. Consider player 1's best reply under the assumption that he can condition
his strategy on an event E which is correlated with F. Given this correlation player 1 will
choose dierent strategies for the case that E does happen and the case that E does not
happen. The correlation also implies that switching these two choices with each other will
lower player 1's utility as he would now play the strategy which ts player 2's strategy in
9the event F best in the event E which is negatively correlated with F and similarly for F.
A simple correction for the size of the events (the parameter ) will not suce to elevate
player 1's utility to the level achieved when playing the best response.
I am aware of three alternative behavioral denitions of independence in the literature
by Branderburger, Blume and Dekel [8], Klibano [19] and Bade [4]. None of the three
denitions builds on the idea of event exchangeability. Brandenburger, Blume and Dekel's
denition of independence uses updated preferences to say that an event E is independent
of an algebra S if preferences over two S-measurable acts f and g never change when
learning (and updating with respect to) the independent event E. Dening stochastic
independence through updating in the present context would be unpractical as there is
little agreement on how to update preferences of decisionmakers whose preferences are
not representable by expected utility functions. Klibano [19] denes two algebras S1
and S2 independent, if an agent is indierent between any i-measurable act f and any
corresponding act fE according to which f is played only if some event E in  i obtains
and the certainty equivalent of f is paid otherwise. Bade [4] characterizes independent
events for preferences that can be represented by minmax utilities following Gilboa and
Schmeidler [16] following various modications of Klibano's notion of independence.
The question how the denition of stochastic independence given above relates to the
denitions provided by Klibano [19] and Bade [4] remains open.
3.2 Agreement
In addition for correlation devices general ambiguous games allow for wildly diverging
beliefs. To see this take the following game between two players that can either travel
to Rome or to Paris. Consider a state space 
1 = f!1;!0
1g and a strategy prole which
prescribes that player 1 goes to Rome, if and only if state !1 occurs. Finally specify
beliefs such that player 1 is sure that !1 occurs and player 2 is sure that !0
1 occurs. We
can nd a pure strategy equilibrium even if we specify preferences such that one player
prefers meetings to being in dierent cities whereas the other has the inverse preference.
The constructed game together with its unappealing equilibrium 
y in the face of the
common prior assumption. In keeping with the goal of a parsimonious deviation from the
theory of mixed strategy equilibrium, I need to impose a condition that would eliminate
10such games from consideration. The diculty lies in the fact that the common prior
assumption, just like strategic independence, is dened in terms of the players expected
utility representations. When players have no priors on the state space, they cannot be
common.
To derive a notion of common beliefs observe that the set of i-null states can be
interpreted as the set of states that are \never" going to happen following player i's
belief. If player i prefers an act f to an act g, even though these two acts only dier on a
state ! player i should better believe that this event could possibly happen. Conversely if
player i is indierent between all acts that dier only on a state ! this event is irrelevant
for player i's payo, he might as well think that this event will \never" happen. Instead of
\common priors" I propose, to require that an event is 1-null if and only it is 2-null. This
assumption can be interpreted as the assumption that players agree on the set of states
that could possibly happen. Observe that this requirement is generally strictly weaker
than the requirement of \common priors": If the players preferences are representable by
expected utilities players agree on null events if and only if they agree on probability zero
events. Given the agreement on null-events one can sensibly dene an event as null if
and only if it is null for player 1 or 2 and as non-null otherwise. The set of all non-null
states of player i is denoted by 
nn
i .
4 Ambiguous Games and Ambiguous Act Equilibria
A general ambiguous game G0 = (
;A;%0) is considered an ambiguous game, if 
1
and 
2 are both 1- and 2-independent and if an event is 1-null if and only if it is 2-
null. Analogously, a general ambiguous act extension G0 = (
;A;%0) of G = (A;%) is
considered an ambiguous act extension of G = (A;%) if it is an ambiguous game.
Ambiguous games and ambiguous act extensions do not reduce to standard games in
mixed strategies or standard mixed extensions of normal form games, when imposing the
requirement that all players' preferences are representable by expected utilities, since the
requirement that players agree on non-null events is not sucient to establish common
priors. Remember though that the main result of this paper (Theorem 1) is a negative
one: it states that the equilibrium play of ambiguity averse and ambiguity neutral agents
is observationally equivalent. Consequently the main result of this paper is strengthened
11by the fact that ambiguous games with expected utility representations are a superclass
of games in mixed strategies: No observational dierence can be derived from varying the
degree of ambiguity aversion and the degree of disagreement between players - as long as
they agree on null events. This nally sets the stage for the denition of ambiguous act
equilibria as Nash equilibria of ambiguous act extensions.
Denition 2 Let G = (A;%). A strategy prole f is called an ambiguous act equi-






i;f i) for all f
0
i : 
i ! (Ai) for i = 1;2:
The notion of ambiguous act equilibrium straightforwardly extends the notion of mixed
strategy equilibrium to the context of players whose preferences do not have expected
utility representations. Just as for the case of mixed strategy equilibrium it is assumed
that each player explicitly randomizes to maximize his own utility given his correct belief
about the strategy of the other. The denition of ambiguous act equilibrium diers from
the denition of mixed strategy equilibrium in that players are assumed to know the
probability with which the dierent actions are chosen by the players according to the
latter denition. While under mixed strategy equilibrium players need to pick objective
mixtures as their strategies, subjectively mixed strategies are permitted in the case of
ambiguous act equilibria. In Section 11.3 I discuss the option to use ambiguous games to
dene another equilibrium concept that would extend the notion of equilibrium in beliefs
to the context of ambiguity averse players. In analogy to the acronym AAE I use the
acronym NE to denote a Nash equilibrium p of a game G = (A;%).
5 Alternative Concepts of Equilibrium
The denition of AAE proposed here diers from the denitions of equilibrium by Klibano [18],
Dow and Werlang [12], Lo [23], Eichberger and Kelsey [13], Marinacci [25] and Lehrer [21]
in that they all use some particular representation of preferences in their denitions of
equilibrium. No particular representation of preferences is assumed in the present context.
Dierent from Dow and Werlang [12], Eichberger and Kelsey [13] and Marinacci [25]
who all extend the notion of equilibrium in beliefs (which I will discuss further in Sec-
12tion 11.3), the present paper assumes that players explicitly randomize. In that aspect the
denition advocated here is closer to the denitions presented by Klibano [18], Lo [23]
and Lehrer [21] as they all assume that players choose mixtures as their strategies. How-
ever, since Klibano [18], Lo [23] and Lehrer [21] all assume that all players' strategy
spaces contain only pure or mixed strategies they cannot directly apply the Nash equi-
librium concept to obtain an analogue to mixed strategy equilibrium for the case of
uncertainty averse players. A player cannot on the one hand know the other player's
mixed strategy and at the same time be uncertain about it. Klibano [18], Lo [23] and
Lehrer [21] all assume that players maximize against their belief on the strategy of the
other players, they do however not assume that this belief coincides with the strategy
of the other. Instead their notions of equilibrium require some conditions of consistency
between beliefs and strategies, which I will elaborate on further in Section 11.4.
This diers markedly from the present denition. I allow for ambiguous strategies.
Consequently, the use of the Nash equilibrium concept to dene AAE does not eliminate
uncertainty. The novelty of the present approach lies in the denition of a game, the
equilibrium concept itself is not new, I use Nash equilibrium. In case of the present
denition players maximize given their belief on the strategy of the other player and this
belief coincides with the actual strategy of the other. There does, however, remain some
scope for uncertainty as no player needs to hold a probabilistic beliefs on the underlying
state space.
The current paper is closest to the approaches proposed in Section 7 of Lo [23], by Ep-
stein [14] and by Azrieli and Teper [2]. Lo constructs a state space and strategies mapping
states to actions for all players to ground his equilibrium concept in an environment in
which player preferences are dened over fundamentals. Lo acknowledges that the proper-
ties of agreement and stochastic independence need to be dened for this environment and
goes on to dene these properties in terms of the particular representation of preferences
he chose. Epstein embeds normal form games in a model of strategic uncertainty similar
to mine. Dierent from my approach he is interested in a notion of rationalizability for
players whose preferences cannot be represented by expected utilities, he therefore does
not impose any properties of strategic independence or common priors on the games he
studies. While Azrieli and Teper's notion of games and equilibria with uncertainty averse
players is quite similar to mine it diers insofar as that neither correlation devices nor
13diverging beliefs are ruled out and that they allow for uncertainty about the environment
as well as for uncertainty about other player's actions.
In Section 11.4 I will compare the main results of the present study with some of the
results that are based on the above mentioned denitions of equilibrium for uncertainty
averse players.
6 Observational Equivalence: Denition
The main claim of this study is that the Ambiguous Act Equilibria and the Nash equilib-
ria of a two player game G = (A;%) are observationally equivalent when the preferences
of all players satisfy Schmeidler's uncertainty aversion in addition to some very standard
assumptions on preferences, such as completeness and monotonicity. Observational equiv-
alence captures the idea that an outsider who only observes the action proles that players
choose cannot tell whether the players are ambiguity neutral or ambiguity averse. In short,
two strategy proles are considered observationally equivalent if their supports coincide.
To proceed any further I need to dene the notion of the support of an ambiguous act.
Denition 3 An action prole a is said to be in the support of strategy prole f if there
exists a non-null state ! such that f(!)(a) > 0. The set of all actions in the support of f
by is denoted by supp(f). Two acts f;g are called observationally equivalent if they
have the same support. Two sets of acts F;G are called observationally equivalent if for
every f 2 F there is an observationally equivalent g 2 G and vice versa.
The support of a constant act p equals the support of the lottery p in the usual sense.
It is important to note that players agree on null-events in ambiguous games. The present
notion of the support of a strategy prole cannot be applied to general ambiguous games
as the set of 1-null states need not coincide with the set of 2-null states in such a game.
Without this assumption the notion of \support" is not well-dened.
The question underlying the denition of observational equivalence is: is there any
action prole that is consistent with equilibrium play among players with particular at-
titude towards ambiguity - neutral or averse - without being consistent with equilibrium
play among players with a dierent attitude towards ambiguity. Said otherwise, is there
any action prole that \proves" that players are ambiguity averse in the sense that this
14action prole is in the support of ambiguous act equilibrium, but is not contained in the
support of any mixed strategy equilibrium?
So one might ask: can an observer not use more than just one action prole to
determine whether the players are ambiguity neutral or averse? Aren't the frequencies
with which all action proles are being played also observable? Yes they are, however, the
question whether some frequencies are consistent with a subjective act is very much open
to debate. To see this take an act f : 
 ! (A) with 
 = f!1;!2g, A = fa1;a2g and
f(!1) = a1;f(!2) = a2 and both !1 and !2 non-null. This act entails no prediction about
the frequency of the occurrence of a1 and a2. I would need to impose further assumptions
on players preferences to relate the observed frequencies to the played acts f. I chose to
avoid this by using the equality of support as my criterion of observational equivalence.
However, ambiguity aversion could be used to explain frequencies that cannot be produced
by mixed strategy equilibria as equilibrium phenomena. As long as players' learning is too
limited to learn the correct frequencies many dierent frequencies are consistent with the
predictions of ambiguous act equilibria. Keeping this in mind the theory of ambiguous act
equilibria can be used to interpret some of the existing empirical evidence against mixed
strategy as equilibrium play of ambiguity averse players.
7 Preferences
Until now I have not specied the preferences of the players beyond requiring the proper-
ties of independent strategies and agreement on non-null events. To get any results some
further requirements will have to be imposed. The four basic properties dened next will
be assumed from here on, if not explicitly mentioned otherwise.
(RAT) Preferences are transitive and complete.
(EU) Preferences over constant acts - that is preferences over lotteries - have an ex-
pected utility representation; for any player i there exists an ane function ui : (A) ! R
that represents the players preferences over constant acts (lotteries) (A).3
(MON) Take two acts f;g. If f(!) %i g(!) holds for all non-null states ! 2 
, then
f %i g. If in addition f(!0) i g(!0) holds for some non-null state !0, then f i g.
3Clearly, I could have stated some more basic properties on the player's preferences over constant acts
that imply (EU). I chose to summarily state these assumptions as (EU) for the sake of brevity.
15(UA) For any two acts f;g : 
 !  with f  g it holds that f + (1   )g % f.
The rst two assumptions (RAT) and (EU) are very much standard, I only mention
in passing that Bewley's [5] representation of preferences for Knightian uncertainty does
not assume completeness, and therefore violates (RAT) as dened here. The denition of
monotonicity provided here is somewhat stronger than the most commonly used denition
of monotonicity (MON') which only requires that f %i g holds for two acts f;g with
f(!) %i g(!) for all non-null states ! 2 
. To see the dierence between the two versions
of monotonicity, observe that the stronger axiom (MON) requires that an act f is strictly
preferred to an act g, if f is strictly preferred to g for a non-null set of states (f(!) i g(!)
for ! 2 E with E non-null) and indierent on all other states (f(!) i g(!) for ! = 2 E).
In this case the weaker axiom (MON') only requires that f is weakly preferred to g.
Following the proof of the main result of this paper, Theorem 1, I will discuss how the
result would change if one was to replace (MON) by the weaker (MON'). The axiom (UA)
was introduced by Schmeidler [28]. He dened \ambiguity aversion" as a preference for
randomization: if an agent is indierent between two uncertain acts then he should like
an objective mixture of these two acts at least as much as either one of them.
Preferences that can be represented by an expected utility satisfy all of the four axioms.
Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] show that preferences satisfy (RAT), (EU), (MON') and (UA)
in addition to a continuity requirement and a restriction of the independence axiom to
mixtures with constant acts if and only if preferences have a maxmin expected utility
representation U(f) = min2C
P
!2
 (!)u(f(!)) for some convex and compact set
of priors C and an expected utility functional u: (A) ! R. The stronger monotonicity
axiom (MON) holds for a maxmin expected utility representation, if and only if all priors 
in the set C are mutually absolutely continuous, in the sense that (E) > 0 for some  2 C
holds if and only if 0(E) > 0 for all 0 2 C and all E  
. Mutual absolute continuity
of the priors in the maxmin expected utility representation has been axiomatized by
Klibano [18] and Epstein and Marinacci [15]. Preferences that have a Choquet expected
utility representation following Schmeidler [28] always satisfy (RAT), (EU) and (MON'),
they satisfy (UA), if and only if the capacity is convex. Cerreira, Maccheroni, Marinacci
and Montruccio [11] characterize the representation of all preferences that satisfy (RAT),
(EU), (UA), (MON') and some form of continuity. Variational Preferences following
Macceroni, Marinacci and Rusticchini [24], Multiplier Preferences following Hansen and
16Sargent [17] and Smooth Ambiguity Averse Preferences following Klibano, Marinacci and
Mukerji [20] all constitute special cases of the preferences described in Cerreira et. al. [11].4
Abstracting from the slight strengthening of the monotonicity axiom the four axioms given
here (RAT), (EU), (MON) and (UA) encompass a very large set of preferences described
in the literature.
8 Observational Equivalence: the Main Result
The assumption of (RAT), (EU), (MON) and (UA) is sucient to show that the set of
Ambiguous Act Equilibria of a game is observationally equivalent to the set of its Nash
equilibria. If these 4 axioms are valid, then there does not exist a single action prole
that is in the support of an equilibrium when players are ambiguity averse without being
in the support of any Nash equilibrium of the game or vice versa. This is the main result
of this paper.
Theorem 1 Let G = (A;%). The set of AAE of G is observationally equivalent to the
set of NE of G.
The next section is devoted to showing the preliminary result that a constant act p
is a NE of G, if and only if it is an AAE of G. This already allows us to conclude that
there are no NE that are not observationally equivalent to any AAE. The following section
establishes the converse conclusion.
9 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
In this section it is shown that a strategy prole p is an NE of a game G = (A;%) if
and only if it is an AAE of that game. The main building block towards that result is
the observation that for any strategy prole f player 1 has a mixed strategy p
1 that is
weakly preferred to f1 keeping the other player's strategy xed at f2. This observation is
the content of the next Lemma.
4The Axiom MON also corresponds to an assumption of mutual absolute continuity in the case of the
Cerreira et. al. [11] framework (and all its special cases). I owe this insight to a private conversation with
Massimo Marinacci. A proof is available from the author upon request.
17Lemma 2 Let G0 = (
;A;%0). For any strategy prole f and either player i = 1;2 there
exists a mixed strategy p
i such that (p
i;f i) %i f and supp(p
i) = supp(fi).
Proof If there exists a pi such that the event f!i : fi(!i) 6= pig is null then we are done
as (pi;f i) i f and supp(pi) = supp(fi) both hold. If no such event exists fi can be




2 are stochastically independent an  can be found such that either
f =
 















(qi : E;pi + (1   )qi : F;fi : E [ F);f i

:
Assume w.l.o.g that the rst indierence holds. Uncertainty aversion implies that i
prefers any mixture of the two indierent acts to f, so we have in particular that
f =
 










(pi + (1   )qi : E [ F;fi : E [ F);f i

for  = 1
2 . If 
nn
i  E [ F we are done. If not the same step can be repeated once
again. The niteness of the state space 
i implies that this process will end after nitely
many repetitions of this step: a p
i such that (p
i;f2) %i f can be found.
To see that supp(p
i) = supp(fi) observe rst of all that supp(p
i)  supp(fi) as p
i is
a mixture over the lotteries fi(!i) for all non-null ! 2 
. Next observe that the mixing
parameter  constructed above assigns positive probability to both pi and qi, the same
would have held for the alternative case in which we would have found an  such that
f i ((qi : E;pi + (1   )qi : F;fi : E \ F);f i). We conclude that the lottery over
lotteries fi(!i) has full support and therefore supp(p
i) = supp(fi). 
The assumption of independent state spaces 
1 and 
2 is crucial for the above proof as
it permits the generation of indierent acts by permuting the strategies played in dierent
events. Uncertainty aversion implies that any convex combination of these indierent acts
is at least weakly preferred. Finally it is a matter of simple algebra to show that there
always exists such a mixture that evens out any uncertainty over the dierent events that
were involved in the permutation of strategies.
18Theorem 2 Let G = (A;%). A mixed strategy prole p is an AAE of G if and only if
p is a NE of G.
Proof Let p be an AAE of the ambiguous act extension G0 = (
;A;%0) of G. So p %0
i
(fi;p i) holds for all deviations fi in particular it holds for deviations p0
i, so p %i (p0
i;p i)
holds and therefore p is a NE of G0. Next assume that p is a NE of G0. Suppose p
was not an AAE of G, that is suppose that there exists a deviation fi for player i such
that (fi;p i) 0
i p. By Lemma 2 we have that there exists a p




i p a contradiction with the assumption that p was a Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 2 should not come as a big surprise. As shown in the preceding lemma, un-
certainty aversion implies that players can always be made weakly better o by objectively
mixing over all the lotteries they use according to their ambiguous act strategies. Given
that the opponent plays a mixed strategy p i, player i cannot be made strictly better
o by an ambiguous strategy. It should be noted though from the proof that Theorem 2
could be strengthened to say that p is a NE of G, if and only if it is an AAE of any
ambiguous act extension of G. As a direct consequence we get the following corollary
Corollary 1 Any ambiguous game G = (
;A;%) has an AAE.
10 Observational Equivalence: the Proof
To prove Theorem 1 I rst show that mixtures that are \dominated", in a sense to
be dened precisely, will never be used in an AAE (Lemma 3). I will then go on to show
that this implies that a player's belief on the equilibrium strategy of the other can always
be represented by a probability (Lemma 4). These two lemmata yield the proof of the
main result of this paper (Theorem 1). It is convenient to use matrix algebra to state and
prove all these results. Some more notation needs to be introduced.
A generic vector x is assumed to be a column vector, row vectors are obtained by
taking the transpose x>. For any two vectors x;y of the same length the relations \ > "
and \  " are dened by x  y if and only if xt  yt for all components t and x > y if
and only if x  y but not y  x. For any  2 R, I denote the vector (;;:::;)> by .
19For a xed strategy prole f dene an jA1j  j
nn




the entry in row j and column k, the expected utility player 1 derives from playing a
j
1
when player 2 plays the mixed strategy f2(!k
2). The submatrix of X that consists only
of the rows j associated with actions a
j
1 2 supp(f1) is called Y (f), the complementary
submatrix (consting only of the rows associated with actions that 1 never plays under
f) is called Z(f). If p>
1 X(f) > q>
1 X(f) holds for some p1;q1 2 (A1) then we say that
p1 dominates q1 at f2. Observe that p>
1 X(f) > q>
1 X(f) implies that player 1 weakly
prefers playing p1 to playing q1 in every non-null state !2 and sometimes strictly prefers
doing so. Consequently, given the assumption of (MON) we have that (p1;f2) 1 (q1;f2)
holds, when p1 dominates q1 at f2. Since I consider a xed strategy prole f, I drop the
argument f in the expressions X(f); Y (f) and Z(f) in the sequel.
Lemma 3 Let G0 = (
;A;%0). Let f be an AAE of G0. Then there do not exist any
p1;q1 2 (A1) with supp(q1)  supp(f1) such that p1 dominates q1 at f2.
Proof Suppose there existed some p1;q1 2 (A1) with supp(q1)  supp(f1) such that
and p>
1 X > q>
1 X. By Lemma 2 there exists a mixed strategy p
1 2 (A1) such that
(p
1;f2) %0
1 f and supp(p
1) = supp(f1) . Since supp(p
1) = supp(f1)  supp(q1) there exists
some r1 2 (A1) with supp(r1)  supp(f1) and an 









q1 + (1   
)r1)
>X < (




p1 + (1   
)r1 dominates p
1 at f2 which implies that ((





1 f, a contradiction with the assumption that f is an AAE. 
The next lemma shows that it is precisely the condition derived in the prior lemma,
namely the absence of two p1;q1 2 (A1) with supp(q1)  supp(f1) such that p1 dominates
q1 at f2, that allows us to conclude that there exists a e p2 with supp(e p2) = supp(f2) such
that player 1 is indierent between playing any action a
j
1 2 supp(f1) when player 2 plays
e p2 and (weakly) prefers playing any of these actions to playing any of the other actions
a
j
1 = 2 supp(f1). The mixed strategy e p2 is constructed as the composite lottery of some
lottery p2 over all mixed strategies f2(!2) that player 2 plays according to f2. Using
matrix algebra the desired result can be expressed as follows: There exists an  2 R and
20a p2 2 (
nn
2 ) such that Y p2 =  and Zp2  , where the matrices Y and Z are dened
as described above.
Lemma 4 Let G0 = (
;A;%0). Suppose there do not exist any p1;q1 2 (A1) with
supp(q1)  supp(f1) such that p1 dominates q1 at f2. Then there exists a probability
p2 2 (
nn
2 ) with full support and an  2 R such that Y p2 =  and Zp2  .
Proof
()) Suppose there exists a p2 2 (
nn
2 ) with full support and an  2 R such that
Y p2 =  and Zp2  . Suppose we also had p1;q1 2 (A1) with supp(q1)  supp(f1) such
that p>
1 X > q>
1 X. This yields a contradiction as  = q>
1  = q>
1 Xp2 < p>
1 Xp2  p>
1  = .
(() Suppose there exists no p2 2 (
nn
2 ) with full support and  2 R such that
Y p2 =  and Zp2  . This is equivalent to S \ r = ; for S;r  RjA1j, r := fj 2 Rg,
and
S := fsjsY = Y p2 and sZ  Zp2 for some p2 2 (

nn




where sY = (sj)a
j
12supp(f1) and sZ = (sj)a
j
1= 2supp(f1) are dened as the subvectors of s
that correspond to actions a
j
1 in the support and outside the support of f1 respectively.
Since S is a convex set there exists a separating hyperplane H such that r  H and
H \S = ;. Let this plane H be described by a vector  such that >x = 0 implies x 2 H
and >x > 0 for all x 2 S. Since 1 2 r  H we have that
P
i = 0.
Next dene two vectors  and  by l = l if l > 0, l = 0 otherwise, l =  l if








; e l =
l P
l
; e l =
l P
l
Observe that e  and  as normal vectors describe the same plane and that e ;e  are elements
of (A1). Consequently we have that e >x > 0 for all x 2 S. As e  = e    e  we have that
e >x > e >x for all x 2 S.
I show next that e j = 0 for all j that are associated with actions al
j = 2 supp(f1).
Suppose we had e j > 0 for such a j. Fix an x 2 S, observe that e >x > e >x has to hold








l = 0 we also
had  = 0, a contradiction with the assumption that  describes the hyperplane H




By our construction of S we can nd such an ~ x that is also an element of S. Observe that
~ 
>~ x = ~ 
>
 j~ x j + ~ j~ xj > ~ 
>
 jx j + ~ j




>x = ~ 
>~ x
Where the very last equality follows from the fact that on the one hand ~ j > 0 implies
~ j = 0 and on the other hand x j = ~ x j. But ~ >~ x > ~ >~ x stands in contradiction with
~ >x > ~ >x holding for all x 2 S. We conclude that ~ j = 0 for all j that are associated
with actions al
j = 2 supp(f1). Therefore supp() is a subset of supp(f1).
To conclude this proof observe that e Xk  e Xk for all columns k of the matrix X as
any such column Xk can be approached by a sequence xn 2 S. Finally, it cannot be true
that e Uk = e Xk for all columns k as we could then nd x 2 S with e x = e x. So it must
be true that e Xk0 > e Xk0 for some columns k0. So we found two probabilities e  and ~ 
such that ~ >X > ~ >Y . 
Combining the preceding two lemmata yields the main result of this paper, which is
proved next:
Proof of Theorem 1
(() Let p be an NE of G, then by Theorem 2 p itself is an AAE of G, so G has an
AAE with the same support.
()) Let f be an AAE of G. Following Lemma 3 there do not exist any p1;q1 2 (A1)
with supp(q1)  supp(f1) such that p1 dominates q1 at f2. Applying Lemma 4 we conclude
that there exists a probability p2 on 
nn
2 with full support such that all a
j
1 2 supp(f1) are
best replies to e p2 which is dened by e p2(a2) =
P
!22
2 p2(!2)f(!2)(a2). Construct e p1 in
the same fashion exchanging the names of player 1 and 2 in the above results. The mixed
strategy prole e p is an NE of G with supp(e p) = supp(f), as all ai 2 supp(fi) are best
replies to e p i for i = 1;2. 
Theorem 1 is the main result of this paper. This result establishes that an outside
observer cannot distinguish the behavior of two uncertainty averse players, from the be-
havior of two uncertainty neutral players when he observes only the outcomes of their play.
Of course, certain conditions have to hold for this result to apply: it is shown that obser-
vational equivalence holds for two player games, where both player's are expected utility
maximizers with respect to lotteries, have monotonic preferences and satisfy Schmeidler's
22axiom of uncertainty aversion. The assumption (EU) was used to dene the matrix U, the
assumption (MON) was used to conclude that (p1;f2) 0
1 (q1;f2) holds when p1 dominates
q1 at f2, nally (UA) was used in Lemma 2 which in turn played an important role in the
proof of Lemma 3.
11 Discussion
11.1 Monotonicity
Weakening (MON) to (MON') the domination of q1 by p1 at f2 only implies that
(p1;f2) %1 (q1;f2). To see that (MON') is not sucient to obtain Theorem 1 consider the
following example of a game that has an AAE that is not observationally equivalent to
any NE.
Example 1
Let the ambiguous game G0 = (
;A;%0) be dened by 
1 a singleton, 
2 = f!1;!2g




Assume that both players have a maxmin expected utility representation following
Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] with C1 = [0;1=2] and C2 = f1=2g the players' sets of beliefs
on !1. Having maxmin expected utility representations both player's preferences auto-
matically satisfy (MON'). On the other hand, player 1's preferences do not satisfy the
stronger condition (MON) as the priors in C1 are not mutually absolutely continuous.
Observe that the strategy prole f according to which player 1 equally randomizes over
his two actions and f2(!1) = L and f2(!2) = R has full support and is an AAE of the
game. To see this it is important to note that, given the belief set C1 and player 2's
strategy f2 player 1 completely discounts the occurrence of the state !1 which is more
favorable for him. However, !1 is not a null state, for some dierent payos !1 could very
23well be relevant for player 1's preference over two acts that dier only on !1. The game
does not have an NE with full support.
The equilibrium constructed in the prior example strikes me as particulary unappeal-
ing. Why would player 1 choose to play T with positive probability when playing B is
never worse and strictly better in some non-null event? Since the equilibrium predictions
using (MON') dier from the equilibrium predictions using the stronger axiom (MON)
only insofar as that under the more common axiom of monotonicity players might use
strategies in equilibrium that are never better than some others and that can be improved
upon strictly for some non-null events, I chose to study mainly preferences satisfying
(MON).
11.2 Games with More than Two Players
Most denitions in this paper can easily be extended to n-player games. In the present
section I will show that the main result of this paper, Theorem 1, does not extend to n-
player games. A theory of games with more than two ambiguity averse players carries the
potential to yield substantially dierent predictions from the standard theory of mixed
strategy equilibrium. I will rst discuss an example of a 3-player game with an AAE
that is observationally dierent from any NE in that game. I will then go on to provide
some reasons why a detailed study of this question lies beyond the scope of this paper, as
the basic understanding of \common priors" developed here does not suce to tackle the
case of n-players. A better grasp of this concept is needed to fully understand the case
of games with more than two players. The following example builds on Example 2.3 in
Aumann [1].











2 be singletons and let 
3 = f!1;!2g, assume furthermore that all
three players' preferences can be represented by maxmin expected utility functions with
24Ci = [1
4; 3
4] for i = 1;2;3.
The strategy prole f with f1 = T;f2 = R and f3(!1) = l;f3(!2) = r is a AAE of
this game. To see this observe that player 3 does not have an incentive to deviate as his
utility is 3 no matter which of the two boxes he picks. Secondly player 1 and 2's utilities

































 0 = 2 < 3:
Aumann [1] shows that the game in Example 2 has no NE with (TRr) or (TRl) in
its support. At the same time he shows that the game has an equilibrium with non-
common priors in which the rst two players play T;R. A necessary condition for the
existence of such a \correlated equilibrium" is that player 1 assigns a higher probability
to player 3 playing l than does player 2. Aumann shows in particular that there is such
an equilibrium if player 1 assigns a probability of 3=4 to player 3 choosing l, whereas
player 2 only assigns a probability of 1=4 to that event. The set Ci = [1
4; 3
4] used in the
example, implies that the two rst players will use exactly these priors when calculating
their respective minimal expected utility of strategy prole f in the above example.
So is a game theory with ambiguity averse players going to herald a revival of game
theory without common priors? Is any NE without common priors observationally equiv-
alent to an AAE with ambiguity averse players? Yes it is - in a very unsatisfactory way.
To see this observe that ambiguous games with expected utility maximizers allow for
non-common priors as long as all players agree on probability zero events. An equivalence
result between the AAE and the NE with non-common priors would not be driven by
the players ambiguity aversion (in fact players would be assumed to be expected utility
maximizers). The assumption that players only agree on null-events is strong enough for
the purpose of the present paper: the observational equivalence result for two players
could be derived using only this weak assumption on the players agreement of beliefs.
25The condition would have to be strengthened considerably for a study of games with
more than two players.
It could be interesting to derive a non-probabilistic axiom of \common beliefs" from
the observation that for the case of risk averse expected utility maximizers the com-
mon prior assumption holds, if and only if full insurance allocations are Pareto optimal.
Billot, Chaetauneuf, Gilboa and Tallon [6] use exactly this observation to develop a no-
tion of \sharing beliefs" for the case of maxmin expected utility maximizers. Example 2
withstands such a strengthening of the requirement of \common beliefs". In fact, the
above example would probably satisfy many dierent notions of \common beliefs" for
uncertainty averse agents as the sets of beliefs of all three players exactly coincide in the
example.6
11.3 Equilibrium in Beliefs
For the case of expected utility maximizers, any mixed strategy equilibrium can be
interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs. According to this interpretation it is assumed
that each player picks a pure strategy. Players do not know the pure strategies picked
by their opponents, instead they form (probabilistic) beliefs about the actual choices
of their opponents. A set of such beliefs constitutes an equilibrium in beliefs if every
action in the support of a player's belief is a best response given the belief of the player
choosing that action. For the case of a two player game with expected utility maximizers
the distinction between equilibrium in beliefs and mixed strategy equilibrium is purely
philosophical. Two probabilities on the set of all actions of the two players constitute a
mixed strategy equilibrium, if and only if they constitute an equilibrium in beliefs.
This changes dramatically once we allow for ambiguously mixed strategies and am-
biguous beliefs. To see why this would be true observe that objective mixing allows an
agent to smooth out subjective uncertainty. So some actions that are not best responses
6Lo [23] covers games with more than 2 players. He assumes that preferences can be represented
following Gilboa and Schmeider [16] and assumes that the belief sets of all players have to be equal. This
is unsatisfactory as we do not have an axiomatic foundation for the assumption that belief sets should
coincide exactly. Eichberger and Kelsey [13] acknowledge that common priors matter for the context of
games with more than 2 players. They do not attempt to tackle this questions in their article.
26when played as pure strategies can be played with positive probability in an AAE. To
formally state and prove the divergence of the two notions of equilibrium observe rst
of all that the denition of AAE presented in the present paper generalizes the standard
denition of mixed strategy equilibrium in the sense that it allows for ambiguously mixed
strategies in addition to objectively mixed strategies.
Just as for the denition of AAE we take ambiguous games as the starting point for
the denition of equilibria in beliefs. An act fi is no longer interpreted as the strategy
chosen by player i, but rather as player  i's belief about the pure strategy of player
i. This generalizes the standard denition of equilibrium in beliefs insofar as that the
belief on the strategy of the other need not be an objective mixture but can be any act.
Consequently, we could call a strategy prole f an equilibrium in beliefs, if every action
in the support of fi is a best response (among the pure strategies) for player i given his
belief f i about the other player's strategy.
Some gaps need to be lled in this denition. Just as for the case of AAE the dierence
between equilibria in ambiguous beliefs and equilibria in beliefs should not be driven by
any extraneous changes in the denition of a game. In short, we need to check whether
the conditions of strategic independence and agreement provided above can also be used
in the present context. The condition that players agree on non-null events would amount
to some condition of \non-delusion". Just as in the above case the condition allows us to
construct the notion of the \support" of an act. The denition of stochastic independence
needs to dier though. Stochastic independence in the present context should mean that
player i's ranking over his response to a belief f i about the other should not depend on
the event !i, which is observed by player i, when the state is !. In the context of expected
utility maximizing agents this denition of stochastic independence is equivalent to the
denition of stochastic independence given above. Outside this context these denitions
need not coincide. With all this in mind we can now give an example of a game in which
equilibria in beliefs and equilibria in ambiguous beliefs do not coincide.
Example 3 Let the ambiguous game G0 = (
;A;%0) be dened by a singleton 
1 and






Observe that this example represents a version of the classical Ellsberg example as a
game between the experimental subject (player 1) and the experimenter (player 2). The
experimenter is not supposed to have any preferences over the outcome of the game, so
his utility is evaluated at the constant value 0. Now interpret the two states of 
2 of
drawing a blue or a green ball from a classical two color Ellsberg urn. If the subject is
uncertainty averse, she might prefer to obtain :4 for sure rather than obtaining 1 only
if a ball of a particular color is drawn from the urn. In that case the act f1 = B and
f2(!1) = L;f2(!2) = R is an equilibrium in ambiguous beliefs. This strategy prole is
not an AAE, as the subject would be strictly better o by objectively mixing between T
and M.
The marked dierence between the two solution concepts generates the need to take
sides. Which one of the two concepts is the appropriate solution concept? The answer
very much depends on whether players (or people) are able to commit to randomize
their strategies. Would a subject in the above experiment be able to commit to a mixed
strategy? Would she be able to ignore her ability to reconsider the action prescribed
by the mixture? Answers to questions like this one certainly depend on a) the time
frame of the decisions and b) what is at stake. Either extreme, namely the assumption
that players either are able to commit fully as well as the assumption that players are
completely incapable to commit seems too strong. In the context of expected utility
maximizers the two assumptions yield the same predictions, so there was no need to
generate an intermediate assumption. In the present context of ambiguity averse players,
the predictions strongly depend on the assumption on the ability to commit to randomized
strategies. Further research may nd a good way to compromise between the two extreme
assumptions.
11.4 Observational Dierence: Other Equilibrium Concepts
28When comparing the notions of equilibrium of the present study with some of the
preceding notions of equilibrium I already pointed out in section 5 that prior denitions
build on particular representations of the players preferences. Klibano [18] as well as
Lo [23] use Gilboa and Schmeidler's maxmin expected utilities to dene their respective
equilibrium concepts, whereas Dow and Werlang [12], Eichberger and Kelsey's [13] as
well as Marinacci's [25] use Schmeidler's Choquet utility representation to dene their
equilibrium concepts. It is puzzling then, that only Lo nds that \the observed behavior
of the uncertainty averse players (the actual strategies they choose) is consistent with
[expected] utility maximization" (Lo [23] page 463), even though the preferences assumed
by all the mentioned studies satisfy (RAT), (EU), (MON') and (UA). I already showed
above in section 11.1, that the weakening of (MON) to (MON') allows for AAE that are
observationally dierent from all NE of a game. To see that the dierence between the
results of the preceding studies and Theorem 1 depend on more than just the dierence
in the monotonicity axiom, let me discuss Klibano's notion of equilibrium at the hand of
an example. A mixed strategy prole is an equilibrium following Klibano if each player
maximizes their utility given their belief on the other and if a consistency condition be-
tween beliefs and and actually chosen strategies holds. The consistency condition requires
that the (mixed) strategy of player i must be part of player  i's belief set Ci about the
strategy of player i. Formally the denition can be stated as follows:
Denition 4 Take a game G = (A;%). A prole of mixed strategies p is considered an
equilibrium or short KE, if there exist two convex and compact belief sets Ci  P(Ai)
i = 1;2 such that p
i maximizes minp i2C i ui(pi  p i) and p
i 2 Ci for i = 1;2.
Let me use the following example of Klibano [18] to show that the dierence between
KE and AAE goes beyond the assumption of dierent axioms of monotonicity.





Klibano shows that (T;L) is a KE. To see this let C1 = [:1;1] and C2 = f1g. Player
2's utility of his strategy p2 can be written as minq2[:1;1] 2(1 p2)q +4p2(1 q) 100(1 
29p2)(1   q). Player 2's utility is maximized at p2 = 1. On the other hand T is player
1's best reply to the pure strategy L. Next observe that (T;L) and C1;C2 satisfy the
consistency requirement. Finally observe that the unique NE of the game is (T;R).
To better understand the dierence between the concepts of AAE and KE let me
rewrite the above example to t the present framework: Consider a general ambiguous
act extension G0 = (
;A;%0) of the above game G with 
1 = f!1;!2g and 
2 a singleton.
Dene f such that f1(!1) = T, f1(!2) = B and f2 = L. For this prole to be an
equilibrium !2 has to be 1-null as T strictly dominates B. On the other hand !2 cannot
be 2-null, as in that case R would be player 2's unique best reply. We conclude that
players must disagree on null events for (T;L) to be an equilibrium. In accordance with
the section on observational equivalence (section 6) the connection between this strategy
prole (T;L) to some empirical predictions becomes dicult: If the researcher was to
agree with player 1 he should be utterly surprised if, B was ever observed. If, on the
other hand, he agrees more with player 2's view of the world, the play of B should be
perceived as normal.
Next it is important to observe that the assumption that players disagree on null events
alone can generate the same strategy prole - uncertainty aversion is not needed. The acts
f1;f2 are best replies to each other when both players are expected utility maximizers
with divergent priors 1(!1) = 1 and 2(!1) = 1=10. Finally it should be noted that
(MON) needs to be violated for (T;L) to be a KE, as the consistency condition requires
that p1 = 1 2 C1 which must contain other priors that assign positive probability to !2
as was argued above.
The equilibrium concepts of Lo and Klibano dier only insofar as that Lo requires
a stronger consistency condition between strategies and beliefs. This condition is strong
enough to imply that players must agree on non-null events; Lo therefore also obtains
a result of observational equivalence. Interestingly, disagreement on null events also un-
derlies most examples provided by Dow and Werlang and Marinacci even though their
concepts could generate observationally dierent results without such disagreement as
they extend the notion of equilibrium in beliefs to the case of uncertainty averse players
(see the discussion in section 11.3).
3012 Conclusion
The rst contribution of this paper is to put Aumann's 1974 framework of games into
service for the analysis of strategic interactions between ambiguity averse players. This
framework allows me to base the denition of an ambiguous analogue to mixed strategy
equilibrium on the standard notion of Nash equilibrium. The second main contribution
of the paper is the proof that an outside observer cannot distinguish whether a game is
played by two uncertainty averse players or two uncertainty neutral ones if players use
explicit randomization devices. The third main contribution concerns the interpretation of
alternative equilibrium concepts for uncertainty averse players. I show that the behavioral
dierences predicted by prior equilibrium concepts in the literature are not so much
a result of the assumption of uncertainty aversion but rather a result on the players
disagreements on the possible occurrence of all events in the state space. Is there any hope
for a manageable theory of games with uncertainty averse players that yields predictions
that dier from standard theory?
For me, the answer is a clear yes. I see the following avenues for future research. We
might want to give up on the assumption that players should agree on null events. If
this is the case then we should do so in a controlled manner: Marinacci [25] does exactly
that. The advantage of his equilibrium concept is that he parameterizes the uncertainty
of players in a game. In the light of the present study such a parametrization seems
very important as it allows us to gradually relax the assumption that players agree on
null events. Marinacci's approach allows us to nd equilibrium predictions for ambiguity
averse players that dier from the equilibrium predictions of mixed strategy equilibrium
while retaining control over the gap between the player's actual strategies and other
players beliefs on these strategies.7 Marinacci's main contribution is a proof of existence
of ME for any level of uncertainty. The concept has yet to prove its merits in applied
studies.
Even if we insist on players agreeing on null events a game theory with uncertainty
averse players might yield observationally dierent results. Theorem 1 crucially depends
on the assumption that there are just two players. In section 11.2 I showed that the
extension of the present theory to more than two players can yield observationally dierent
7Eichberger and Kelsey [13] provide an alternative parametrization of the degree of uncertainty in a
game.
31results. Schmeidler's [28] assumption of uncertainty aversion (UA) also plays a certain role
for the validity of Theorem 1. If games with ambiguity averse players are instead modeled
following Bewley [5], predictions that dier observationally from the standard theory of
mixed strategy equilibrium can be obtained. In section 11.3 I showed that a translation of
the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity averse players can yield
observationally dierent results from the concept of mixed strategy equilibrium. In short:
the negative result for the model of two players games introduced here should highlight the
potential for all the positive results that could arise when relaxing the various assumptions
made in the present model.
References
[1] R. Aumann, \Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies", Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 1, (1974), pp. 67-96.
[2] Y. Azrieli and R. Teper, \Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium Existence in Games
with Incomplete Information", mimeo, Tel Aviv University 2009.
[3] S. Bade, \Electoral Competition with Uncertainty Averese Parties", mimeo, Penn
State University, 2007.
[4] S. Bade, \Stochastic Independence with Maxmin Expected Utilities" mimeo, Penn
State University, 2008.
[5] T. Bewley, \Knightian Decision Theory: Part I.", Decisions in Economics and Fi-
nance, 25, (2002), pp. 79-110.
[6] A. Billot, A. Chateauneuf, I. Gilboa and J.-M. Tallon, \Sharing Beliefs: Between
Agreeing and Disagreeing", Econometrica, 68, (2000), pp. 685-694.
[7] S. Bose, E. Ozdenoren and A. Pape, \Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity", Theoretical
Economics, 1, (2006), pp. 411-438.
[8] A. Brandenburger, L. Blume and E. Dekel, \Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice
Under Uncertainty" Econometrica, 59, (1991), pp. 61-79.
32[9] C. Camerer and M. Weber, \Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncer-
tainty and Ambiguity", Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, (1992), pp. 325-370.
[10] P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt and T. Groseclose, \Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer", The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 92, (2002), pp. 1138-1151.
[11] S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci and L. Montrucchio, \Uncertainty
Averse Preferences, Carlo Alberto Notebook 77, 2008.
[12] J. Dow and S. Werlang, \Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking
Down Backward Induction", Journal of Economic Theory, 64, (1994), pp. 305-324.
[13] J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey, \Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria", Games
and Economic Behavior, 30, (2000), pp. 183-215.
[14] L. Epstein "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium, Journal of Economic The-
ory, 73, (1997), pp. 1-29.
[15] L. Epstein and M. Marinacci, \Mutual Absolute Continuity of Multiple Priors, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 137, (2007), pp. 716-720.
[16] I., Gilboa and D., Schmeidler, \Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior",
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, (1989), pp. 141-153.
[17] L. Hansen and T. Sargent, \Robust Control and Model Uncertainty", American
Economic Review, 91, (2001), 60-66.
[18] P. Klibano, \Uncertainty, Decision and Normal Form Games", mimeo, Northwest-
ern, 1996.
[19] P. Klibano, \Stochastically Independent Randomization and Uncertainty Aver-
sion", Economic Theory, 18, (2001), pp. 605-620.
[20] P. Klibano, M. Marinacci and S. Mukerji, \A Smooth Model of Decision Making
Under Ambiguity", Econometrica, 73, (2005), pp. 1849-1892.
[21] E. Lehrer, \Partially-Specied Probabilities: Decisions and games", mimeo, Tel Aviv,
2008.
33[22] D. Levin and E. Ozdenoren, \Auctions with Uncertain Numbers of Bidders", Journal
of Economic Theory, 118, (2004), pp. 229-251.
[23] K.C. Lo, \Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty", Journal of Economic Theory,
71, (1996), pp. 443-484.
[24] F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci and A. Rustichini: \Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness,
and the Varionational Representation of Preferences", Econometrica, 74, (2006), pp.
1447-1498.
[25] M. Marinacci, \Ambiguous Games", Games and Economic Behavoir, 31, (2000), pp.
191-219.
[26] S. Mukerji and J.-M. Tallon, \An Overview of Economic Applications of David
Schmeidler's Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty", Chapter 13 in Uncer-
tainty in Economic Theory: A Collection of Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler's
65th Birthday, I. Gilboa ed, Routledge Publishers, 2004.
[27] I. Palacios-Huerta, \Professionals Play Minimax", The Review of Economic Studies,
70, (2003), pp. 395-415.
[28] D. Schmeidler, \Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity",
Econometrica, 57, (1989), pp. 571-587.
[29] M. Walker and J. Wooders, \ Minimax Play at Wimbledon", The American Economic
Review, 91, (2001), pp. 1521-1538.
34